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N January 4, 1980, the President announced an
embargo on grain exports to the Soviet Union in
response to the Soviet armed invasion of Afghanistan.
In announcing the embargo, the President reported:
“The 17 million tons of grain ordered by the Soviet
Union in excess of that amount which we are com-
mined to sell under a five-year agreement will not be
delivered, This grain was not intended for human
consumption but was to be used for building up
Soviet livestock herds.
I am determined to minimize any adverse impact on
the American farmer from this action. The undeliv-
ered grain will be removed from the market through
storage and price support programs and through pur-
chases at market prices. We will also use increased
amounts of grain to alleviate hunger in poor countries
and for gasohol production here at home.
After consultation with other principal grain export-
ing nations, I am confident that they will not replace
these quantities of grain by additional shipments to
the Soviet Union.”1
Secretary of Commerce Philip M. Klutznick stated
that the embargo was imposed “in order to show the
1”Text of Carter Speech on Soviet Ties,” St. Louis Post Dis-
patch, January 6, 1980, p. 2E.
2
U.S.S.R. in tangible ways that aggression is costly
and will be met with firmness. .. .Thus it was de-
cided that action should be taken to cut off these
significant resources and to exert pressure on the
U.S.S.R. in this area to convince the Soviet leaders
to halt their aggressionin Afghanistan and to dissuade
them from making new military thrusts in Pakistan
and Iran.”2
The Russian Grain Embargo:
Dubious Success
Expected Impact on Soviet Union
Prior to the embargo, Soviet consumption of grain
was projected to be 228 million metric tons (MMT)
for the July/June 1979-80 marketing year. This figure
was approximately 3 MMT less than the previous
year’s consumption due to the Soviet Union’s below
average grain crop in 1979-80. Of their projected
consumption, the Soviets planned to import 35 MMT.3
U.S. exports of grain to the Soviets in 1979-80 were
2Statement by Philip M. Klutznick, Secretary, U.S. Department
of Commerce, in U.S. Embargo of Food and Technology to
the Soviet Union, Flearings before the Subcommittee on Inter-
national Finance of the Committee on Banking, Housing, and
Urban Affairs, 96th Congress, 2 Sess. (Washington, D.C.:
Government Printing Office, 1980), p. 28.
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expected to total 25 MMT, valued at about $2.3 billion
and equal to about 11.2 percent of Soviet grain con-
sumption for the year, considerably above the 4.8 per-
cent supplied in 1978-79.~
The embargo was designed to limit U.S. grain ex-
ports to the Soviet Union to 8 MMT, an amount to
which the U.S. was committed under the 1975 five-
year grain sale agreement. Following the embargo,
USDA officials estimated that the Soviets would be
unable to import more than 22 MMT of grain from
all sources.5
The embargo was expected to have its chief effect
on livestock output and the consumption of animal-
derived foods rather than on human consumption of
grain. The U.S.S.R.’s dependence on U.S. grain re-
sulted from a Soviet decision to improve the people’s
diets. The Soviet Union had maintained a commit-
ment to increase domestic consumption of livestock
and poultry and had achieved a 25 percent increase
in meat production during the past decade.°President
Carter told Congress that the embargo could cause
Soviet meat consumption to drop by 20 percent.7 Vice
President Mondale expressed a similar view: “We
estimate they will have to liquidate substantial num-
bers of livestock. ...While this does not affect nutri-
tion levels,” he added, “it will undermine the U.S.S.R’s
objective of supplying high-protein meat to the
Soviet people.”8 Similarly, Secretary of Agriculture
Bergland reported, “it is possible the grain embargo,
if it forces large-scale livestock slaughter in the Soviet
Union, may result in long-term change in U.S.S.R.
diets.”9
Soon after the embargo, specific forecasts of its im-
pact on the Soviet livestock industry were made.
Based on the assumption that the Soviets would ob-
tain an increase in grain supplies of about 3 MMT from
non.U.S. origins in March-July 1980 and reduce their
stocks by 3 MMT, feed use of grain in the March-July
period was forecast at about 44 MMT, down from
a figure of 51 MMT that had been estimated prior to
4
Statement by Dale E. Hathaway, Under Secretary for Interna-
tional Affairs aad Commoday Programs, U.S. Department of
Agriculture, in U.S. Embargo of Food and Technology to the
Soviet Union, p. 54.
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Hathaway, “Statement,” p. 53.
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the embargo.1° The 7 MMT March-July cutback
would reduce the intended 128 MMT level of feeding
for the entire 1980 calendar year by 5 percent.
The USDA reported that the cutback in grain avail-
ability for 1980 could reduce U.S.S.R. meat produc-
tion by approximately one million tons. This reduc-
tion represents a cutback of about 7 percent in U.S.S.R.
meat production, which currently totals about 15 mil-
lion tons annually. The expected cutback would be
somewhat greater than indicated by the 5 percent re-
duction in grain, because the imported grain was fed
mainly to hogs and poultry, which have a relatively
high grain-to-meat conversion rate.” If, as a result of
the feed shortage, the Soviets would decide to liqui-
date herds by increasing current slaughter, they could
defer the cutback in meat production until later in
the year.
Expected Impact on Grain Trade
The embargo has been in effect long enough to
measure its effectiveness in restraining U.S. grain ex-
ports and reducing Soviet grain imports. One way
is to compare the USDA forecasts of U.S. exports and
Soviet imports made immediately prior to the embargo
with forecasts made following the embargo.
As shown in table 1, a summary of the forecasts
from December 1979 through mid-1980 indicates that,
initially, the embargo was expected to have a major
impact on Russian grain supplies. However, subse-
quent revisions indicate that the embargo’s impact
was much less pronounced than originally expected.
For example, in December 1979, net Soviet imports
for the July-June 1979-80 year were estimated at 33.2
MMT. Immediately following the embargo, the Janu-
ary 15, 1980 forecast of imports was reduced sharply
to 24.4 MMT, or 27 percent less than the pre-embargo
total. In succeeding months, however, the estimates
were revised upward until the June estimate of 30.4
MMT was only 2.8 MMT or 8 percent less than the
pre-embargo estimate. The June estimate indicated
that the overall Soviet grain supplies (excluding
changes in stocks) would be down only 1.3 percent
from the pre-embargo forecast.
The pre-embargo supply of grain for livestock feed-
ing for 1979-80 in the U.S.S.R. was estimated at 128
MMT. This estimate was reduced to 122 MMT, down
‘
0
Foreign Agriculture Circular (Washington, D.C.: U.S. De-
partment of Agriculture, January 13, 1980), p. 2.
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Table 1
USDA Estimates of Russian Grain Supplies, Utilization for
1978-79, and Forecasts for 1979-80 (Million Metric Tons)
July-June Production Feed
estimates for Produclion Imports (net) plus imports utilization
1978-79 237 12.8 249.8 125
Forecasts for
1979-60 as of:
12/11/79 179 33.2 212.2 128
1/15/80 179 24.4 203.4 122
2/11/80 179 27.5 236.5 125
3/10/80 179 29.7 208.7 126
4/10/80 179 29.7 208.7 126
5/09/80 179 29.7 208.7 126
6/11/80 179 30.4 209.4 126
Source: I aicign la!: it -oIl on. (‘mylar ( \Va~hington.JiG.: U.S. I)epartioc’it of Agriculture).
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5 percent, immediately following the embargo. By Impact on Grain Prices
June, however, the estimate was raised to 126 MMT,
only 2 percent below the pre-embargo level. The re-
vised estimates of grain for livestock feed were not
based on revisions in estimated production. Produc-
tion estimates remained unchanged at 179 MMT
throughout the period from December 1979 to June
1980. While the tight grain supplies in the Soviet
Union resulted in a slower growth of herds and flocks
than was expected earlier, there was no evidence of
liquidation of breeding animals.
Estimates of total United States exports likewise
indicated that the impact of the grain embargo was
declining each succeeding month. January-February
1980 estimates of total U.S. exports of feed grains,
soybeans, and wheat for the marketing year 1979-80
were well below the December 1979 estimates (table
2). For example, estimated exports of feed grain for
the 1979-80 marketing year were reduced from 71.1
MMT in December 1979 to 65.9 MMT in January-
February 1980, and wheat estimates were reduced
from 1,400 to 1,325 million bushels. By July, however,
these estimates had been revised upward so that they
closely approximated the pre-embargo levels. Corn
exports, estimated at 2,400 millionbushels, were some-
what less than the pre-embargo estimate, but the July
estimate of 71.1 MMT for all feed grains was equal
to the pre-embargo estimate. The July estimate for
wheat, at 1,375 million bushels, was only 25 million
bushels less than the pre-embargo estimate.
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Table 2
Estimated U.S. Grain Exports for 1979~8O*
Feed grains Corn Soybean Wheat
Estimate (mit. metric tons) (mit. bu.) (mit. bu.) (mit. buj
December 1979 71.1 2,500 825 1,400
January-
February 1980 65.9 2.275 615 1.325
March 65.9 2,275 615 1.325
April 69.1 2,400 820 1,325
May 71.0 2.400 820 1.350
June 71.0 2,400 625 1,375
July 71.1 2,400 850 1.375
9iarkctiiig >1-ar L,egaim Octohem I for feed grain am d LI)
1
. mi. September 1 for soyhtalis, anti
J nime I for wheat.
Source: ,\grirultm~ralOutlook- ( Wa~hingtom.D.C.: L’S. J)epartruent ut Agricmilture
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Table 3
Prices of Grain in Specified Markets (in U.S.
Dollars at Current Exchange Rates)*
1979-80
December January February March
U.S. No. 2 Yellow corn, $ per bu. $2.93 $2.69 $2.89 $2.80
Canada feed No. 1, $ per cwt. 4.40 4.51 4.35 4.31
Rotterdam pellets. $ per cwt. 7.71 6.21 7.85 7.17
dAli exchamige rates are monthly arerage~.
Source: I-AC) .\fommtlthj Bmull~ tin of S/a/istmc.s (Borne, Eta]> 1-nod nut Agrkulture Orgammiz.m—
lion of the United Nations. May, MiSt)), vim1. 3.
Doubts Expressed About Effectiveness grains and wheat are produced throughout much of
of Embargo the world, and the destination points of American
grain offer little information as to the ultimate avail-
Opposition in the U.S. to the embargo developed ability of the shipment or of substitute grains to the
shortly after its announcement. The Senate Subcom- Russians. Any nation willing to supply more grain to
mittee on International Finance of the Committee on Russia and less to other nations (which, in turn, pur-
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs began bearings chase U.S. grain as replacement) would nullify the
in late January to “consider whether the embargoes embargo. Such nations would not have to be net
are an effective means of making the Russians pay exporters of grain. Net importers who would be will-
a price for their invasion of Afghanistan, their effect ing to purchase more U.S. grain while simultaneously
on the U.S. economy, and prospects for a positive selling their own grain to the Soviets would reduce the
effect upon Russian behavior 13 The American effectiveness of the embargo as much as would net
Farm Bureau, while favoring stiff sanctions for the exporters who increase their sales of grain to the
Soviets, expressed doubt during the hearings that the Soviets.
embargo would reduce Russian meat production by
more than 3 percent. If the embargo was effective, it would result in two
prices for grain in the international market. A rela-
Patterns of Trade Changed tively low price would prevail among those nations
that cooperate with the U.S. and deny exports to the
While the embargo reduced direct shipments of Soviets, and another higher price would prevail for
grain from the U.S. to the Soviets, it did not succeed the Soviets and those nations that sell grain to them.
in gi-eatly reducing the availability of grain to the As Robert Gilpin points out, the Soviets can easil~
Russians. Grain is a highly fungible commodity. Not switch their purchases of grain to countries that have
only can one carload be replaced by another carload, the incentive to arbitrage the two price situations.14
but one type of feed grain can be substituted for an-
other. Even wheat, which is largely used for human Although there is insufficient evidence to determine
food, can be substituted for feed grain with relatively which nations permitted increased grain shipments to
moderate losses in value, Furthermore, most animal the Soviets following the embargo, the available data
feeds are to some extent substitutes. Hence, tracing indicate certain unusual patterns of trade. Table
the flow of American grain through various commer- 4 shows a number of countries that sharply increased
cial channels to make certain that the embargoed grain imports from the U.S. in the first four months
grain or substitute feed would not ultimately reach of 1980, compared with the first four months of other
the Soviets would be virtually impossible. Most feed recent years. For example, the Democratic Republic-
‘
3
Statement by Senator Adlai E. Stevenson, Chairman of The
t4
Statement by Professor Robert Gilpin Princeton Univ,-m-si’.’.
Subcommittee on International Finance, in U.S. Embargo of in U.S. Embargo of Food and Technology to the Sn ui-I
Food and Technology to the Soviet Union, p. 1. Union, p. 184.
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of Germany, which had not previously been a major
importer of U.S. grain, suddenly became a major im-
porter in 1980. Other major grain producing nations,
such as Argentina, could have sold less grain to other
grain importing countries and sold a larger portion of
their grain to the Soviets. In effect, this action would
allow the Soviets to import Argentine grain, for ex-
ample, as a substitute for U.S. grain. The data suggest
that a world market for grain continued to function,
but through new channels of trade, following the
embargo’s impediment to established channels.
Concept of World Grain Market ignored
The embargo’s major weakness was its failure to
recognize the fact that there is a world commercial
grain market that continues to function despite gov-
ernment controls and despite trading between govern-
ments that often ignores the market price. Since grain
continues to move from areas where grain prices are
relatively low to areas where prices are relatively high,
the only sure way of enforcing a grain embargo on
the Soviets would have been to obtain guarantees
from each nation that it would not export more grain
to the Soviets (produced either in the U.S. or locally)
than it would have exported without the embargo.
The apparent failure of the U.S. grain embargo to
achieve its stated objective does not mean that it
had no impact on U.S. farm income or on the cost of
grain to the Soviets. It undoubtedly had some impact
on both. It interrupted the efficiency of the market
channels from the U.S. to the Soviet Union, thus in-
creasing the grain handling and shipping costs. For
example, part of the grain which ultimately reached
the Soviet Union was shipped initially through non-
Soviet ports before finally entering the Soviet Union;
in these cases, this additional step increased shipping
costs and commissions for handling the grain. Both
the grain consumer and the producer pay for such
inefficiencies. Consequently, the U.S. farmer obtained
a somewhat lower price for his grain and the Soviets
paid somewhat more for their food and feed as a
result of the embargo.
SUMMARY
Although the embargo on grain sales to the Soviets
was designed with the best of intentions, it had only
a negligible impact on Soviet grain supply and on
total U.S. grain exports. Estimates of the Soviet grain
supply for the year ending in June were only one
percent less than the pre-embargo forecasts. Estimates
of U.S. grain exports were reduced sharply immedi-
ately following the embargo, but rose very soon after
it was announced and, by July of this year, were ap-
proximately the same as the pre-embargo estimates.
Domestic prices for grain declined sharply immedi-
ately following the embargo, but regained most of the
loss by early Febrnary. The embargo apparently al-
tered world patterns of grain trade, as evidenced by
the sharp increase in imports of U.S. grain by some
nations following the embargo. Hence, there is evi-
dence that large quantities of U.S. grain were shipped
to nations which normally purchase grain from other
7
Table 4
Estimated January-April Imports of Feed Grains by Selected Countries
(Thousands of Metric Tons)
COUNTRY 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980
Brazil N.A. NA. 0 0 79.6 308.8
Federal Republic, Germany 1,221.0 1,458.0 1,399.3 813.0 376.6 642.6
Democratic Republic, Germany NA. N.A. 108.5 98.4 236.0 1,175.5
Poland 410.0 849.0 403.2 500.7 341.9 756.0
U.S.S.R. 519.0 4,564.0 1,606.1 4,159.0 1857.6 2,303.0
Spain 1,435.0 849.0 648.7 907.0 871.8 1,649.5
Other 9,707.0 8,397.0 10,383.8 10,060.2 13.226,9 15152.6
All nations 14,369.0 16,635.0 14,924.1 16,777.6 17579.9 24,113.9
Son ret. /- ortign AiltU nIt m~ref lrath of the I nzted SIan -s (Wa
4
,in awn, I).C. .S - Jiepartinenl of .~gricu1t ore), suppli awl icr)
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sources, thereby permitting these sources to supply
grain to the Soviet Union.
Nevertheless, the embargo did have an impact on
both the Soviets and the U.S. in that it resulted in
less efficient patterns of trade and less efficient means
of marketing. These inefficiencies increased somewhat
the cost of food and feed to the Soviets and reduced
somewhat the returns to U.S. farmers.
8